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Robert Schapiro
Dean and C. Hugh Friedman
Professor of Law

I.

Introduction

T

he University of San Diego School of Law
is pleased to announce the second annual
Blue Brief, a faculty review of ten carefully
selected rulings from the most recent Term
of the United States Supreme Court. USD has
an extraordinarily distinguished law faculty,
and I believe that you will enjoy reading their
assessments of cases ranging across a variety
of important topics, including abortion, gun
rights, prayer in the execution chamber, free
speech, free exercise of religion, arbitration,
administrative law, federal Indian law, climate
change, and vaccine mandates.

judge on the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit and on the
United States District Court for the District
of Columbia. Justice Jackson is the first Black
woman to serve as a Supreme Court justice. This
Term was notable for an additional, and wholly
unexpected, reason — the unprecedented leak of
a full draft of a Supreme Court majority opinion.
The ripple effects of that event remain to be seen.
We are very happy to share the insights of nine
of our eminent faculty on these ten important
Supreme Court decisions. We are eagerly
awaiting the opening of the Court’s new Term
on October 3, 2022, and we look forward to
reporting back to you in the summer of 2023
with the latest developments.

This was indeed a momentous Term in many
respects. The Court’s decisions charted
new paths in several significant areas of
the law. This Term also marked the end of
Justice Stephen Breyer’s long and illustrious
tenure on the Court. He was nominated by
President William Clinton and has served
as a Supreme Court justice since 1994. This
summer witnessed the accession to the Court
of a new justice, Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson,
a distinguished jurist who earlier served as a

U N I V E R S I T Y O F SA N D I E G O S C H O O L O F L AW
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Larry Alexander
Warren Distinguished Professor of
Law and a Co-Executive Director of the
Institute for Law & Religion

II.

Ramirez v. Collier and Religion in the
Execution Chamber

J

ohn Ramirez was convicted of murder for
the 2004 stabbing death of Pablo Castro in
Corpus Christi, Texas. He was sentenced
to death.

government demonstrates that the burden
furthers a compelling governmental interest
and is the least restrictive means of furthering
that interest. In 1990, in Employment Division
v. Smith, the Supreme Court, reversing its
approach of the prior twenty-seven years, held
that laws of general applicability that burden
religious exercises need not be shown to further
a compelling interest. Congress immediately
and overwhelmingly passed the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) to restore
the pre-Smith approach; but the Court in City
of Boerne v. Flores held that Congress had no
power to apply RFRA to the states. Nonetheless,
when Congress enacted the RLUIPA, which also
adopts the pre-Smith approach to burdens on
religion, it chose to apply it to the states. And
unlike RFRA, RLUIPA’s application to the states
has not been invalidated by the Court.

After years of unsuccessful appeals and
collateral attacks, Ramirez was scheduled to
be executed in September 2021. He sought
to have his pastor present in the execution
chamber and to be permitted to pray audibly
and to touch Ramirez during the execution.
When the Texas prison officials denied the
audible prayer and touching requests (but not
the request for the pastor’s presence), Ramirez
then sought a preliminary injunction to halt
the execution, contending that the denial of
his requests for audible prayer and a religious
touch violated the federal Religious Land Use
and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000
(RLUIPA).

In Ramirez v. Collier, the Court granted the
request for a preliminary injunction, finding
that Ramirez was likely to prevail on the merits
of his RLUIPA claim. Ramirez’s religious
exercise was burdened by the denial of his

RLUIPA prohibits substantial burdens on
the religious exercise of prisoners, including
state prisoners, even if the burden stems
from a law of general applicability, unless the
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joining the Roberts opinion, each wrote a
separate concurrence.

Ramirez illustrates how the
Court will apply the compelling
interest test and the least
restrictive alternative test.

requests, and the prison officials’ concerns
about disruption and interference with the
execution, which the Court asserted were indeed
compelling interests, could nevertheless be
addressed without completely prohibiting any
audible prayer or religious touching of Ramirez.
Eight of the nine justices signed on to Chief
Justice Roberts’s opinion for the Court.
Justices Sotomayor and Kavanaugh, though

Only Justice Thomas dissented. He believed
that Ramirez had engaged in abusive litigation
tactics and thus did not merit equitable relief.
He chronicled the shifts in Ramirez’s litigation
positions that, in Thomas’s opinion, were badfaith attempts to delay the execution. Thomas
also argued that Ramirez had failed to exhaust
his administrative remedies, as is required by
the federal Prison Litigation Reform Act of
1995 (PLRA). (The majority had considered and
rejected both of Justice Thomas’s arguments.)
Ramirez v. Collier is a case that turns on its
particular facts and does not establish any
important precedent. At most, it serves
to illustrate how the Court will apply the
compelling interest test and the least restrictive
alternative test—as Justice Kavanaugh pointed
out in his concurrence, both tests are quite
imprecise and require difficult judgments.

Larry Alexander
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Laurence Claus
Professor of Law

III.

An Expanded Right to Bear Arms in Bruen

T

wo members of the New York State Rifle &
Pistol Association applied for unrestricted
licenses to carry handguns in public for
personal protection. Their applications were
denied because they did not “demonstrate a
special need for self-protection distinguishable
from that of the general community.” The
applicants and their Association sought
declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that
denial of their applications violated the Second
Amendment to the United States Constitution,
made applicable to state governments through
the Fourteenth Amendment.

In finding that the applicants had a right to
carry handguns in public, the Supreme Court
in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v.
Bruen put the onus on government regulators
to show that their regulations are “consistent
with this Nation’s historical tradition of firearm
regulation.” After surveying the historical
evidence, the majority concluded: “Apart from
a few late-19th century outlier jurisdictions,
American governments simply have not broadly
prohibited the public carry of commonly used
firearms for personal defense. Nor, subject
to a few late-in-time outliers, have American
governments required law-abiding, responsible
citizens to ‘demonstrate a special need for
self-protection distinguishable from that of
the general community’ in order to carry arms
in public.”

The Second Amendment provides: “A well
regulated Militia, being necessary to the
security of a free State, the right of the people to
keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” In
its Heller and McDonald decisions, the Supreme
Court held that the Amendment confers an
individual right to possess handguns for selfdefense. Those cases concerned possession in
the home. Now the Court turned its attention to
possession in public.

U N I V E R S I T Y O F SA N D I E G O S C H O O L O F L AW

Justice Breyer’s dissent drew a very different
picture from the same historical evidence,
arguing that this evidence well supported New
York’s regulatory scheme. He also questioned
the majority’s singular focus on a historical

|

Fa culty R e v ie w o f 2 0 2 1 - 2 2 Sup re m e C o urt Te rm

|

Page 6

record that could so readily be read in such
different ways. The lower courts had been right,
he argued, to consider directly in their decision
making the public interests served by gun
regulation.

play. First, technology. Second, affordability.
Third, regulation. Not historic regulation, but
regulation now. The Court did not acknowledge
the circularity of using a criterion for
permissible regulation now that has regulation
now as one of its key determinants. When selfdefense is the reason for arming ourselves, we
will see in common use the most destructive
weapons that those seeking self-defense can
readily afford, on the simple arms-race logic that
self-defense depends on not being outgunned by
the attacker. What caps the destructive heights
to which that arms race will go? Regulation.
After the Dunblane massacre of schoolchildren,
the United Kingdom largely banned possessing
handguns. Handguns are, as a consequence, not
in common use in the United Kingdom. Long
before the Port Arthur massacre, Australia had
largely banned possessing handguns. Handguns
are, as a consequence, not in common use
in Australia.

The majority contended that “[m]uch like we
use history to determine which modern ‘arms’
are protected by the Second Amendment, so
too does history guide our consideration of
modern regulations that were unimaginable
at the founding.” How did history inform the
Court’s judgment about which modern weapons
are protected by the Second Amendment? The
majority observed:
At most, respondents can show that
colonial legislatures sometimes prohibited
the carrying of “dangerous and unusual
weapons”—a fact we already acknowledged
in Heller. See 554 U. S., at 627. Drawing
from this historical tradition, we explained
there that the Second Amendment protects
only the carrying of weapons that are those
“in common use at the time,” as opposed
to those that “are highly unusual in society
at large.” Ibid. (internal quotation marks
omitted). Whatever the likelihood that
handguns were considered “dangerous
and unusual” during the colonial period,
they are indisputably in “common use”
for self-defense today. They are, in fact,
“the quintessential self-defense weapon.”
Id., at 629. Thus, even if these colonial
laws prohibited the carrying of handguns
because they were considered “dangerous
and unusual weapons” in the 1690s, they
provide no justification for laws restricting
the public carry of weapons that are
unquestionably in common use today.

Gun regulation today is not being
guided by the deep moral principles
of our history, but by mistakes made
much more recently.

The majority claimed to be drawing their vision
of permissible regulation from the periods
when the Second and Fourteenth Amendments
were adopted, and not from the history of
twentieth-century gun regulation. Yet it is only
the permissiveness of twentieth-century gun

What brings a particular weapon into
“common use” for self-defense in a particular
time and place? Three factors come into
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regulation in the United States that has let highcapacity handguns become “the quintessential
self-defense weapon” here.
Today’s high-capacity handguns are more
capable of use for mass destruction than any
of the crude and clumsy artifacts that our
ancestors outlawed for being “dangerous and
unusual.” Today’s handguns let their users
kill many people quickly and with ease. When
we see embedded in our history a principle

precluding “dangerous and unusual” weapons,
why wouldn’t we recognize that principle to call
for calibrating regulation to danger? The more
potential harm a weapon can cause, the more
regulated its possession should be. That is how
the rest of the civilized world thinks about gun
regulation. Gun regulation in a society that has
more guns than people, and more than one
mass shooting per day, is not being guided by
the deep moral principles of our history, but by
mistakes made much more recently.

Laurence Claus

U N I V E R S I T Y O F SA N D I E G O S C H O O L O F L AW

|

Fa culty R e v ie w o f 2 0 2 1 - 2 2 Sup re m e C o urt Te rm

|

Page 8

Donald Dripps
Warren Distinguished Professor of Law

IV.

Major Crimes and Major Premises in
Castro-Huerta

O

klahoma v. Castro-Huerta held that
Oklahoma courts had jurisdiction to punish
non-Indian offenders for serious crimes
against Indian victims in Indian country.
(Following the usage of Congress and the
Supreme Court, I use the term “Indian” rather
than “Native American”.) Oklahoma prosecutors
accused Castro-Huerta of committing
felony child neglect in Tulsa. The state court
convicted, and sentenced Castro-Huerta to
thirty-five years in prison.

Castro-Huerta is not an Indian, but his victim
is. Castro-Huerta appealed his state convictions,
arguing that after McGirt, Oklahoma had no
jurisdiction to punish crimes by non-Indian
perpetrators against Indian victims in Tulsa.
The Oklahoma courts agreed and reversed the
state convictions. The Supreme Court, again by
a five-to-four vote, sided with Oklahoma and
reinstated the state convictions.
Both McGirt and Castro-Huerta addressed
whether federal jurisdiction over crimes in
Indian country preempted state jurisdiction.
If an Indian defendant is accused of certain
specified serious offenses (including murder
and kidnapping), federal jurisdiction preempts
state jurisdiction to punish the same conduct.
The MCA, does not, however, cover crimes by
non-Indians against Indian victims on tribal
territory. A separate statute, the General
Crimes Act (GCA), applies the criminal laws
Congress provides to govern federal enclaves,
the District of Columbia excepted, such as
military bases and national parks to places

In McGirt v. Oklahoma, the Court held that
much of eastern Oklahoma is “Indian Country”
for purposes of jurisdiction to punish crimes.
McGirt, an enrolled member of the Seminole
tribe, was convicted in Oklahoma state court
of three sexual assaults. The Court, by a fivejustice majority speaking through Justice
Gorsuch, reversed the convictions because the
Major Crimes Act (MCA) confers exclusive
jurisdiction over offenses by Indians in Indian
country and thus ousts state court jurisdiction
over criminal offenses.

U N I V E R S I T Y O F SA N D I E G O S C H O O L O F L AW
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within “the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of
the United States.”
The GCA’s reference to “the sole and exclusive
jurisdiction of the United States” parallels
similar language in the MCA. The Castro-Huerta
majority, however, refused to read the GCA
symmetrically with the MCA. According to
Justice Kavanaugh’s majority opinion, the GCA
“simply ‘extend[s]’ federal law to Indian country,
leaving untouched the background principle of
state jurisdiction over crimes committed within
the State, including in Indian country.”

Oklahoma is not one of the states named in P.L.
280. As Justice Gorsuch pointed out in dissent,
in 1968 “Congress amended Public Law 280 to
require tribal consent before any State could
assume jurisdiction over crimes by or against
Indians on tribal lands.” Oklahoma, however,
neither sought tribal consent nor petitioned
Congress for a statutory grant of power.

In the end, Castro-Huerta might
prove practically momentous less
for what it accomplishes and more
for what it catalyzes.

It might seem that the policy behind exclusive
federal jurisdiction—protecting Indians from
unfair treatment in state courts—would suggest
a symmetrical reading even if the language
of the GCA does not. With respect to Indian
victims, however, state jurisdiction supplements
federal jurisdiction under the GCA. From the
majority’s perspective, relying solely on federal
prosecutions both taxed federal resources
and provided inadequate law enforcement.
The majority noted that “[a]fter having their
state convictions reversed, some non-Indian
criminals have received lighter sentences in plea
deals negotiated with the Federal Government.
Others have simply gone free.”

U N I V E R S I T Y O F SA N D I E G O S C H O O L O F L AW

Apart from the MCA and the GCA, a third
pertinent statute is P.L. 280 (enacted in 1953
and codified here). The statute expressly confers
state jurisdiction to punish crimes committed
in Indian country in six named states. It also
revoked federal jurisdiction, under the GCA
and the MCA, in those same areas. Prosecutions
for crimes premised on interstate commerce,
such as drug trafficking under the Controlled
Substances Act or robbery under the Hobbs
Act, are still possible, just as they are possible
throughout state territory. The overall design
of P.L. 280 was to align state and federal power
inside Indian country in a way that parallels the
state/federal division of labor outside of it.

|

If Congress intended states to exercise general
criminal jurisdiction on crimes by non-Indians
against Indians on tribal territory, there
would have been no need for the specific
authorizations in the 1953 statute nor the tribalconsent provision in the 1968 legislation. Why
grant power that, according to the majority,
the states always had? Justice Kavanaugh
replied for the majority that P.L. 280 authorizes
state prosecutions of Indian defendants. If
that were the purpose, however, there was
no need to include “or against” in the text of
P.L. 280, which reads: “Each of the States or
Territories listed in the following table shall
have jurisdiction over offenses committed
by or against Indians in the areas of Indian
country listed . . .” (emphasis added).
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The clash over P.L. 280 reflected the
fundamentally different premises of the
majority and the dissenters. For the majority,
the starting point was state sovereignty, while
for the dissenters, the starting point was tribal
sovereignty. If, in the absence of clear statutory
direction from Congress, the norm is state
sovereignty, the applicable statutes can be
read as not displacing that state authority. If,
however, one takes a different default rule—no
state authority to punish crimes on tribal lands
except when Congress explicitly so provides—
the relevant statutes can be read as reflecting
that default rule.

did not hold that the states have jurisdiction to
punish Indian offenders for crimes in Indian
country. Even with respect to jurisdiction over
non-Indian defendants, specific treaties and
state statutes may mean that Castro-Huerta
does not automatically apply in every state
with respect to every tribe. Many states already
exercise jurisdiction over Indian as well as
non-Indian defendants. Prior to Castro-Huerta,
twenty-one states already exercised criminal
jurisdiction over crimes “by or against” Indians
in Indian country. Permitting states to prosecute
non-Indian defendants seems a less sweeping
change than was worked by P.L. 280.

Both approaches are backed by precedent.
McGirt followed earlier cases in holding that
the MCA preempts state power to punish Indian
defendants for crimes committed in Indian
country. Other cases, however, have held that
the state courts have jurisdiction over crimes
in Indian country by non-Indians against nonIndians. As the majority noted, that holding
seems to exclude treating reservations as
federal enclaves.

In the end, Castro-Huerta might prove practically
momentous less for what it accomplishes
and more for what it catalyzes. How criminal
justice in Indian country should be regulated
is ultimately a question for Congress. Congress
hasn’t revisited that subject since 2010.
In Castro-Huerta, the majority pointed out
important weaknesses of federal prosecutions,
and the dissent countered that adding state
authority might very well make matters worse.
The plausibility of both positions suggests the
desirability of a thorough reconsideration of
the roles played by the Justice Department,
the tribal court systems, and the states. Only
Congress can do that.

The profound disagreement about structural
premises, and the exceptional complexity of the
doctrinal materials, might suggest a decision
of grave consequences. That suggestion would
be a mistake. Most obviously, Castro-Huerta

Donald Dripps
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Dov Fox
Herzog Research Professor and
the Director of the Center for
Health Law Policy & Bioethics

V.

The Vaccine Cases and Administrative Power

O

n January 13, 2022, the Supreme Court
issued per curiam rulings in two cases
about federal vaccine mandates. In both,
the legal question boiled down to whether a
federal agency—the Department of Health and
Human Services in one case, the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration in the other—
exceeded the statutory authority that Congress
has granted to it.
In Biden v. Missouri, a narrowly divided Court
upheld an HHS requirement that 10 million
healthcare workers be vaccinated for COVID-19.
In National Federation of Independent Business
v. Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and
Health Administration, the Court struck down a
similar mandate that OSHA imposed on large
private companies that employ about 84 million
employees across all industries.
In this pair of cases, the Court has positioned
itself as a check on federal power. The majority
in both interprets a congressional statute to
determine the scope of an agency’s power to
protect public health and safety in response to a

U N I V E R S I T Y O F SA N D I E G O S C H O O L O F L AW

|

national emergency in the COVID-19 pandemic.
The opposing outcomes turn on the deference
that the Court affords to each agency in light of
its past regulations of health and safety for the
population that it is charged with protecting.
The HHS mandate in Biden v. Missouri applied
to covered staff at facilities that receive
funding from Medicare or Medicaid. Workers
who failed to comply could lose their job or
be fined, unless they qualified for medical or
religious exemptions. A 5-4 majority held that
this requirement fell within the scope of HHS’s
statutory authority to enact regulations that are
“necessary in the interest of [public] health and
safety.” The Court deferred to HHS’s altogether
reasonable finding that vaccinating healthcare
staff against COVID-19 was required to prevent
transmission of the disease to the high-risk
patients they served.
Justice Thomas dissented, joined by Justices
Alito, Gorsuch, and Barrett. The dissent’s
focus was the absence of clear congressional
delegation to issue a nationwide vaccination
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mandate. Despite the health and safety
provisions, Justice Thomas argued that HHS
had exceeded its scope because Congress did
not expressly authorize the agency to mandate
vaccinations during a pandemic. Justice Alito,
joined by the same three justices, separately
dissented on procedural grounds.

fell squarely within OSHA’s authority to
set workplace standards designed to keep
employees safe and healthy at work. In
their view, the statute doesn’t require that
OSHA’s regulations apply to hazards found
only in the workplace. They criticized the
majority for imposing this artificial limit on
OSHA’s authority.

The NFIB v. OSHA case consolidated dozens of
challenges to OSHA’s rule that employers with
at least 100 employees must require that they
be vaccinated, unless the employees abided
by an alternative set of regulations. Workers
who declined to be vaccinated for medical or
religious reasons wouldn’t be fired so long as
they submitted to weekly testing at their own
expense and wore a mask on the job. The only
exceptions were for employees whose work was
entirely remote, outdoors, or alone.

The opposing outcomes of these two
cases turn on the deference that the
Court affords to each agency in light
of its past regulations of health and
safety for the population that it is
charged with protecting.

A 6-3 Court held that the mandate exceeded
the scope of OSHA’s authority to set workplace
standards “to provide safe or healthful
employment.” The majority classified the
vaccine requirement as a broad public
health measure for which the agency lacked
congressional authorization because COVID-19
is a hazard that extends beyond the workplace.
OSHA determined that the mandate would save
thousands of lives and prevent hospitalizations;
the challengers argued that the mandate would
cost billions of dollars and induce resignations.

Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kavanaugh
represented the decisive votes in each case.
Both elected to uphold the HHS mandate but
strike down the OSHA one. One reason for
may be the interpretative evidence they looked
to beyond the statutory text. The majority
also made mention of previous HHS and
OSHA regulations to inform the limits of each
agency’s authority. The Court noted that HHS
has routinely issued regulations that obligate
participating facilities to protect patient health
and safety. The vaccine mandate went further
than past HHS regulations—after all, the agency
had previously been able to rely on compliance
with state requirements—but fit within its

In NFIB v. OSHA, the Court did not defer to
OSHA like it did to HHS in Biden v. Missouri.
Rather, the Court disregarded OSHA’s findings,
explaining that such tradeoffs should be
evaluated by politically accountable actors and
not unelected judges.
In a joint dissent, Justices Breyer, Sotomayor,
and Kagan argued that the vaccine requirement

U N I V E R S I T Y O F SA N D I E G O S C H O O L O F L AW
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longstanding practice of protecting healthcare
workers and patients.

workplace,” in the sense that COVID-19 is a
hazard encountered wherever people gather,
not just at work. That is why the Court held
that the mandate exceeded OSHA’s authority.
Agencies’ ability to respond to emergencies
may now depend on the reach of their
previous regulations.

OSHA lacked this historical precedent. The
Court reasoned that OSHA had never before
issued a regulation “addressing a threat that
is untethered, in any causal sense, from the

Dov Fox

U N I V E R S I T Y O F SA N D I E G O S C H O O L O F L AW

|

Fa culty R e v ie w o f 2 0 2 1 - 2 2 Sup re m e C o urt Te rm

|

Page 1 4

Orly Lobel
Warren Distinguished Professor of Law
and the Director of the Center for
Employment and Labor Policy

VI.

In Viking River Cruises, the Court Once Again
Favors the Federal Arbitration Act

I

n a series of cases over the past few decades,
the Supreme Court has made it easier for
companies to demand arbitration from their
employees and consumers. In this term’s Viking
River Cruises v. Moriana, the Court continued
its interpretation of the Federal Arbitration
Act (FAA) as preemptive of any contravening
state law. Passed in 1925, the FAA was designed
to limit common law restrictions in the use of
arbitration. As it has been interpreted by the
Court in the past decades, the FAA receives
primacy over state and other federal legislation.

Act of 2004 (PAGA). The trial plaintiff, Angie
Moriana, brought action against her former
employer Viking River Cruises, Inc., seeking
recovery of civil penalties under PAGA for
unpaid final wages and other wage and hours
violations.
A PAGA representative action is a type of qui
tam action, whereby a private individual aids
the government in recovering civil penalties
on behalf of the state. In a PAGA suit, the
California Labor and Workforce Development
Agency receives 75 percent of the award while
the affected employees receive the remaining
25 percent. PAGA authorizes an aggrieved
employee to file a claim “on behalf of himself or
herself and other current or former employees”
for violations of the Labor Code. In 2014, the
California Supreme Court in Iskanian v. CLS
Transp. Los Angeles, LLC invalidated contractual
waivers of representative claims under
PAGA. The Iskanian Court explained that the
government entity in a PAGA action “is always
the real party in interest.” It further held that
PAGA cases are not class actions, but bilateral

Employees and consumers are regularly
required to sign pre-dispute arbitration clauses,
with class action waivers, as part of their
employment contracts. In AT&T Mobility LLC
v. Concepcion and Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis,
the Court held that class action waivers in
both consumer and employment pre-dispute
arbitration agreements were enforceable.
In Moriana, the Court held that the Federal
Arbitration Act further preempts California’s
employee rights to assert representative claims
under California’s Private Attorneys General
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proceedings, and therefore an anti-waiver rule
does not conflict with what Epic Systems had
described as “Concepcion’s essential insight”
that “courts may not allow a contract defense to
reshape traditional individualized arbitration
by mandating classwide arbitration procedures
without the parties’ consent.”

as a state actor is a “transparent effort to avoid
the FAA’s preemptive effect” that attempts
to avoid the FAA’s reach by conceptualizing
claims as “particularly intertwined with state
interests.” Viking claimed that the Court’s FAA
precedents require enforcement of contractual
provisions waiving the right to bring PAGA
actions because PAGA creates a form of class or
collective proceeding.

Moriana is yet another blow against
worker collective action, in a time
in which workplace regulations
are notoriously underenforced,
especially with regards to the most
vulnerable, lowskilled workers.

In Moriana, the Supreme Court rejected the
California court’s interpretation of PAGA and
class waivers. The employer in this case moved
to compel arbitration of Moriana’s individual
PAGA claim pertaining to a violation she alone
suffered, and to dismiss her representative
PAGA claims on violations that she and others
experienced. The trial court denied that motion,
and the California Court of Appeal affirmed,
holding that categorical waivers of PAGA
standing are contrary to state policy. Viking
argued that the Court’s FAA precedents require
enforcement of contractual provisions waiving
the right to bring PAGA actions because
PAGA creates a form of class or collective
proceeding. In its petition for certiorari, Viking
contended that the “legal fiction” California
has created by treating the aggrieved plaintiff
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The Court adopted a more complicated
reasoning, but in essence rendered a win for
the employer. The majority opinion, written
by Justice Alito, held that PAGA actions were
not like class actions where a representative
plaintiff’s individual claims were used as a
basis to adjudicate the claims of multiple
parties at once. Rather, the Court reasoned
that PAGA plaintiffs represent a principal (the
Labor Workforce Development Agency) and
can assert a number of claims on behalf of
the state. As a result, the Court reasoned that
the procedural mechanisms that render class
actions ill-suited to bilateral arbitration—
class certification, notice to the class, and
so on—do not apply to PAGA. However, the
Court held that the procedural structure of
PAGA, which enables a plaintiff to add claims
on behalf of other employees, and the FAA
were inconsistent. To that end, the Court held
that the PAGA plaintiff’s ability to introduce
claims of other employees could require the
parties to arbitrate a claim that they did not
consent to, such as in the case where the parties
agreed to individual arbitration. Somewhat
ironically, the Court forced the employee
PAGA waiver under the reasoning that other
employees had not consented to a collective
arbitration. The Court ruled that Viking was
entitled to compel individual arbitration of
Moriana’s individual PAGA claim. The Court
also determined that, because PAGA does not
provide a mechanism for the court to adjudicate
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representative PAGA claims once the individual
claim has been committed to a separate
proceeding (such as arbitration), Moriana lacked
standing to maintain her representative claims.
Accordingly, Moriana’s representative PAGA
claims were subject to dismissal. Because the
individual and representative PAGA claims
could not be split, the Court forced the plaintiff
to arbitrate her individual claims and to accept
her representative PAGA rights waiver.
The decision is yet another blow against
worker collective action. Justice Alito, partially
quoting Epic Systems, emphasized that the
FAA “preempts any state rule discriminating
on its face against arbitration” as well as any
substantive rule about arbitration that “could be
used to transform ‘traditiona[l] individualized . .
. arbitration’ into the ‘litigation it was meant to
displace’ through the imposition of procedures
at odds with arbitration’s informal nature.”

As I have argued in my research, pre-dispute
arbitration agreements, now typically including
class waivers, alongside other employment
restrictive covenants, including broad
non-disclosure clauses, have the effect of
suppressing employee voice, concealing valuable
market information about compliance and
corporate conduct, and reducing enforcement of
regulatory protections. Workplace regulations
are notoriously underenforced, especially
with regards to the most vulnerable, lowskilled workers. However, Congress can act
to reform the FAA. The Forced Arbitration
Injustice Repeal (FAIR) Act would prohibit
the enforcement of mandatory, pre-dispute
arbitration contracts involving consumer,
employment, antitrust, and civil rights disputes.
Until then, the result of Moriana is that
arbitration agreements can now prevent an
employee from bringing a PAGA claim on behalf
of other employees.

Orly Lobel
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Professor of Law

VII.

In Dobbs, An Earthquake With Many
Possible Aftershocks

“R

oe was egregiously wrong from the start,”
declared Justice Alito in Dobbs v. Jackson
Women’s Health Organization, a scathing
opinion that extinguished the 50-year-old
constitutional right of women to access
abortion. States and the federal government can
now regulate abortion as they see fit.
The right to abortion had no basis in the Court’s
substantive due process jurisprudence, Justice
Alito wrote, either as a matter of “history and
tradition” or under the Court’s prior precedents
protecting the right to privacy. For support, he
cited liberal legal icons such as John Hart Ely,
Laurence Tribe, and even the late Justice Ruth
Bader Ginsburg.
Roe deserved no respect as precedent because
it was partisan and political, only reflecting the
justices’ own sense of justice, charged Justice
Alito. Casey deserved even less respect—it
purported to reaffirm Roe but in fact overturned
its “strict scrutiny” test with a balancing test
that had sown decades of confusion about what
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abortion regulations did or did not constitute an
“undue burden.”
The fundamental flaw, Justice Alito wrote, was
that the right to abortion was not based in our
“history and tradition” of fundamental rights.
Since the mid-twentieth century, “history and
tradition” has been the test for discerning
unenumerated rights and liberties; the problem
is that the Court has used a variety of looser
and stricter versions of this test. Dobbs used the
narrowest and most originalist version, one that
examined protected rights as they stood around
the mid-1860s when the 14th Amendment was
framed and ratified. States had begun to ban
abortion in the 1830s, and by 1870 most states
had banned it. This history demonstrated to the
Dobbs majority that no one had thought that the
14th Amendment’s due process clause protected
the right to abortion. (It is hard to imagine that
abortion would have been a protected right—
maternity was viewed as women’s natural state,
and women, deprived of the right to vote and
a separate legal existence, could not shape the
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“history and tradition” of our rights.) Lacking
proper pedigree, abortion restrictions will now
be upheld if they are merely “rationally related
to a legitimate state interest,” the same standard
for upholding laws that impinge on the “right”
of employers to pay substandard wages.
This narrow, originalist history and tradition
test shakes the foundation upon which rest
Griswold (the right of married persons to
use contraception), Eisenstadt (the right of
unmarried persons to use contraception),
Lawrence (the right to intimate sexual conduct in
the home), and Obergefell (the right to same sex
marriage). None of these were “protected rights”
in 1868. (Neither was the right to “interracial
marriage,” but Loving held that those laws
violated not only the due process clause but
the equal protection clause, too.) Dobbs, Justice
Alito reassured, does not call into question
these rights: abortion is unique, he wrote,
because women’s right to abortion necessarily
extinguishes potential life. The rights to marry,
use contraception, or have sex with a consenting
adult pose no like dangers.
True, but—in light of the rational basis test—
beside the point. In 1868, all of these “liberties”
were fair game for states or the federal
government to regulate or ban, and many did
so. This originalist “history and tradition” test
could therefore require the Court to uphold
these laws if they are “rationally related to a
legitimate state interest.” The types of state
interests Dobbs held to be “rationally related to”
abortion bans suggests that Griswold, Eisenstadt,
Lawrence, and Obergefell may be in danger. Dobbs
held that states could rationally ban abortion to
outlaw surgical abortions by deeming abortions
to be gruesome or barbaric procedures that
caused fetuses pain or that ended the life of a
fetus. Preserving fetal life over the interests
of a pregnant woman and the conclusion
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that surgical abortion is barbaric are moral
judgments—weighty ones, to be sure, but still
moral judgments.

Dobbs purports to bring
certainty and the rule of law
to a divisive and controversial
issue, but it has ushered in
new and grave uncertainties
about many other rights.

Alarmingly, Dobbs held that preserving the
health or life of a woman would be a rational
basis for abortion bans. That proposition stands
medical science on its head. Childbirth is at
least fourteen times more dangerous than
abortion for the average American woman.
Childbirth is even more dangerous for African
American women, who face a maternal
death rate almost 250% higher than the
American average.
The Court had struck down bans on same-sex
marriage, contraception, and certain sexual
conduct because states’ moral justifications
standing alone did not justify those regulations.
Dobbs undercuts that reasoning. For example,
some believe that some forms of contraception
destroy “life.” Justice Alito himself wrote in
dissent in Obergefell that it was unclear whether
same-sex marriage harmed children born into
such a marriage (actually, no such harms exist)
or undermined the institution of marriage itself.
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Uncertainty, he wrote, should permit states to
ban it if they see fit.
An opinion that purports to bring certainty and
the rule of law to a divisive and controversial
issue has ushered in new and grave uncertainties
about many other rights. The crucial five votes

may not yet exist to overrule Griswold, Obergefell,
or Lawrence; Justice Kavanaugh says he has
no interest in revisiting those precedents, and
Chief Justice Roberts values stare decisis. But the
key word is “yet.” The aftershocks of Dobbs will
be felt for years to come.

Miranda McGowan
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VIII.

Placing Limits on Administrative Agencies in
West Virginia v. EPA

I

n a term with many potential blockbusters
on the Supreme Court’s docket, West Virginia
v. EPA was anxiously anticipated as raising
some of the most consequential issues. Not
only did West Virginia raise a very important
question concerning EPA’s power to restrain
existing coal-fired power plants from emitting
carbon dioxide, it also was thought that it
might lead the Supreme Court to announce a
strict nondelegation doctrine or to overrule
Chevron deference—each of which would have
dramatic consequences on administrative law
generally. In the end, the case turned out not
to directly touch either the nondelegation
doctrine or Chevron, but it still was a significant
blockbuster, both because of its effect on
EPA’s authority and its invocation of the major
questions doctrine—another doctrine likely to
have significant effects on administrative law.

performance for these plants. A “standard of
performance” is one that “reflects the degree
of emission limitation achievable through the
application of the best system of emission
reduction which (taking into account the cost
of achieving such reduction and any nonair
quality health and environmental impact and
energy requirements) the [EPA] Administrator
determines has been adequately demonstrated.”
Simplifying this definition, it basically requires
the EPA to set a standard (for a category of a
stationary source of air pollution) which applies
the best system of emission reduction, taking
costs (and other factors) into account.
Since the enactment of the Clean Air Act, the
majority wrote, such standards have “always
set emissions limits under section 111 based on
the application of measures that would reduce
pollution by causing the regulated source to
operate more cleanly.” The standards “had never
devised a cap by looking to a ‘system’ that would
reduce pollution simply by ‘shifting’ polluting
activity from ‘dirtier to cleaner’ sources.” For
example, EPA set the standard for new steam

The main question raised by West Virginia
involved the limits on the emission of carbon
dioxide from existing coal-fired power plants
under section 111(d) of the Clean Air Act.
The Act authorizes EPA to issue a standard of
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generating units by determining that they use
“a combination of high-efficiency production
processes and carbon capture technology.” But
for existing coal-fired plants, EPA set a different
and historically unprecedented standard that
required permissible emissions to be determined
by reference to the emissions from natural gasfired plants or wind and solar plants.

West Virginia was a blockbuster
that clearly established, perhaps
for the first time, that there is
a major questions doctrine that
limits interpreting statutes to
confer significant delegations
to the executive.

concluding that Congress’” meant to confer
such authority. In these cases, the majority
stated, the major questions doctrine requires
that Congress clearly indicate it intends to
confer such authority.
In West Virginia, the six-member majority
concluded that EPA’s claim of authority for the
power plant represented such an extraordinary
case. The statutory language did not clearly
indicate that EPA enjoyed such unprecedented
authority. Significantly, the Court did not claim
that EPA lacked authority to regulate against
climate change generally. It merely concluded
that the attempt to require existing coal-fired
plants to reduce emissions to the level of natural
gas sources or wind and solar sources exceeded
its authority under section 111(d).

EPA argued for its interpretation of a standard
of performance based on an abstract reading
of the term’s definition, while West Virginia’s
position was supported by a reading of the
term’s definition based on the historical
interpretation of the provision.

Some observers had predicted that West
Virginia would lead to a revival of the strict
nondelegation doctrine, which holds that broad
delegations to agencies are unconstitutional, or
to an overturning of Chevron deference, which
would have denied agencies deference for their
interpretation of statutes. But West Virginia
avoided these questions. By concluding that the
statute did not authorize EPA’s action, the Court
avoided the need to address the nondelegation
doctrine. And by concluding that the statute
could not be read as authorizing the agency’s
action, the Court avoided the need to address
whether EPA should receive Chevron deference.

But while Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion for
the majority relied on this latter interpretation,
it also employed what it termed the major
questions doctrine for support. Under
this doctrine, “there are ‘extraordinary
cases’ …in which the ‘history and the breadth of
the authority that the agency has asserted’ and
the ‘economic and political significance’ of that
assertion, provide a ‘reason to hesitate before

In a concurrence, Justice Gorsuch sought to
set the major questions doctrine on a firmer
footing. Gorsuch argued that the doctrine
was similar to other clear statement rules
that attempted to protect against Congress
unintentionally violating the Constitution.
Without the doctrine, it would be easier
for Congress to unintentionally make an
unconstitutionally broad delegation to an agency.
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Justice Kagan, writing for herself and the two
other progressive justices, dissented from
the majority opinion. Kagan believed that the
Clean Air Act’s language conveyed significant
authority and flexibility on EPA to set standards
of performance, permitting EPA to adopt the
standard of performance at issue here. Justice
Kagan also denied that the Court’s precedents
adopted a major questions doctrine. Instead, she
attempted to account for the cases the majority
had relied upon based on ordinary statutory
interpretation principles.

In the end, West Virginia was another
blockbuster reached by the Court’s new
conservative majority. The case not only
restricted EPA’s efforts to regulate against
climate change, but also clearly established,
perhaps for the first time, that there is a major
questions doctrine that limits interpreting
statutes to confer significant delegations to
the executive.

Michael Rappaport
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IX.

A Unanimous Court Divides over Religion
and Speech in Shurtleff

I

n Shurtleff v. City of Boston, the Supreme
Court unanimously reversed the lower
federal courts and held that the City of
Boston violated the Constitution when it
refused to allow a Christian group to fly a
Christian flag from one of three flagpoles in
front of Boston’s City Hall. The city had a
long-standing practice of allowing groups to
hold ceremonies on City Hall Plaza, and to
raise a flag of their choosing for a few hours on
the day of their ceremony. The city had never
before refused permission to a group’s flag,
nor had it ever announced a policy restricting
such flags or suggested that the flags “spoke”
for the city rather than for the private groups
using the plaza. But when Harold Shurtleff,
head of a conservative Christian group, wanted
to raise what he called a Christian flag for his
group’s event, the city refused, saying that it
would violate the Constitution’s prohibition on
“establishment of religion” to fly a religious
flag at City Hall. In Shurtleff, all the justices
agreed that Boston had created a public forum
for these flag raisings, and that excluding a
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religious flag was impermissible “viewpoint
discrimination” in violation of the First
Amendment.
The justices were unanimous for the outcome,
but not for Justice Breyer’s majority opinion.
A series of concurrences from four of the
more conservative justices show that there are
differences of view, or at least of emphasis,
on the Court, both about what is meant by a
“public forum,” and about what is meant by
“establishment of religion.”
Justice Breyer emphasized that the government
is entitled to speak in its own name, and when
it does, to control what is expressed. Boston
could easily have made it clear in advance—
although it never did so in this case—that the
flagpole outside City Hall was for expression
of Boston’s official sentiments, not a forum
for free expression by the public. If so, then
a government body would be free to reject
religious messages: perhaps it would be
constitutionally obliged to do so.
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Justice Kavanaugh, who also joined the Breyer
majority, filed a short concurrence to the effect
that government mustn’t exclude or discriminate
against religious expression when secular
speakers or programs are given a public forum.

Shurtleff marks a suitable farewell
to Justice Breyer.

Justice Alito, joined by Justices Thomas and
Gorsuch, concurred separately, differing from
Justice Breyer about how readily to find that
the government is “speaking” in its own name.
These justices warned that Breyer’s “holistic”
consideration of whether government is
“speaking” might mean that government could
be deemed to “speak”—and hence to have the
power to control or censor the content—when
it licenses or provides a forum for private
expression, even by granting a copyright or
providing meeting space on a public campus.
Alito’s three would find government speech
only when “a government purposefully
expresses a message of its own through persons
authorized to speak on its behalf.” These
justices also emphasized that religious programs
or messages must not be excluded when
government maintains a public forum open to
other viewpoints.
Justice Gorsuch, joined by Justice Thomas,
filed a further concurrence, citing both original
understanding and numerous Supreme Court
precedents from recent decades, to reject the
“tests” for establishment of religion in the 1971
case of Lemon v. Kurtzman, and to underscore
the position that whereas government adoption
of a religion offends the Constitution, “treating
a church on par with secular entities and other
churches does not.”
The various opinions in Shurtleff thus reiterate
longstanding differences between the Court’s

left-leaning and right-leaning justices over what
is meant by establishment of religion, and also
mark somewhat newer differences over what is
meant by government speech or a public forum.
Left-leaning justices since the mid-twentieth
century have been more radically “separationist”
about religion and government, whereas rightleaning justices view the establishment clause
as primarily a safeguard against discrimination
for or against any particular religion. These
opinions go on to suggest that right-leaning
justices are readier to view government as
creating a public forum—without power to
control the content of what is expressed—than
are the left-leaning justices.
But at least in this case, there was no
disagreement about the outcome. In fact, the
Biden Administration and the American Civil
Liberties Union filed briefs supporting Harold
Shurtleff, perhaps fearing what the result and
the precedent might be if the Court were to
divide over the City of Boston’s rejection of his
religious flag. Justice Breyer’s majority opinion
is good-natured and erudite, offering enjoyable
lore about flags and architecture along the
way. The unanimous result in the case, despite
underlying differences of principle, marks a
suitable farewell to Justice Breyer as his career
on the Court draws to a close.

Maimon Schwarzschild
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X.

A Touchdown for Prayer in Schools in Kennedy

E

xactly what had happened was hotly
contested in Kennedy v. Bremerton School
District: the majority opinion by Justice
Neil Gorsuch and the dissenting opinion by
Justice Sonia Sotomayor paint starkly different
pictures. Cutting through complexities,
though, this much seems clear enough: Joseph
Kennedy, a football coach at Bremerton High
School, adopted a practice of kneeling briefly in
prayer at the 50-yard line following games. He
welcomed players, of either team, who chose to
join him. Perceiving Coach Kennedy’s practice
as a violation of the constitutional separation
of church and state, the school district told
him to stop. He didn’t stop. He was suspended.
He sued. Lower courts sided with the school
district. But the Supreme Court reversed, 6-3,
ruling that the coach’s practice did not violate
the First Amendment’s establishment clause; on
the contrary, the practice was protected by that
amendment’s free exercise of religion and free

speech clauses.

How significant is the decision, and why?
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Previous Supreme Court opinions had
consistently invalidated various forms of
prayer in public schools—classroom prayer,
prayer at graduation ceremonies, prayers piped
over the loudspeakers before football games,
even a “moment of silence” for meditation or
“voluntary prayer.” At least technically, though,
Kennedy does not subvert those rulings because
the Court viewed Coach Kennedy’s prayer as
private not school-sponsored speech.
Of more general importance, the majority
opinion explicitly repudiated the received
doctrine of the Establishment Clause—the
so-called Lemon test—as well as the corollary
doctrine that deemed it unconstitutional for
government to send messages “endorsing”
religion. But just as a practical matter, as Justice
Gorsuch explained, those doctrines had long
been effectively defunct anyway. And if, as a
leading constitutional scholar once observed,
the amorphous Lemon test was “so elastic in
its application that it means everything and
nothing,” official abandonment of the test just in
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supporters (of whom Justice Sotomayor is
probably the leading representative on the Court
today), it also has significant vulnerabilities.
More specifically, the paradigm misrepresents
religion. Although some people may regard
their faith as entirely personal, religion for
many people and in its inherent character is not
and never has been purely private in its scope;
and the Court’s repeated pronouncements
could not make it so. In addition, the paradigm
amounted to a significant break from the
American political tradition. Governmental
leaders (Washington, Lincoln, even Jefferson—
not to mention Biden and Trump and Obama)
have often invoked religion in their public
performances. And religion has heavily and
openly influenced political movements from the
Revolutionary War to anti-slavery campaigns
to women’s suffrage to the modern civil rights
movement. As a constitutional doctrine,
the private religion paradigm owed less to
James Madison and Thomas Jefferson than
to William Brennan. Like John F. Kennedy a
few years later, Justice Brennan adopted the
paradigm as a personal philosophy: challenged
at his confirmation hearings about ostensible
conflicting loyalties, he explained that he
could be Catholic “as a private citizen” but
that religion would not influence his work as
a justice. Once on the Court, Justice Brennan
basically worked (often against vigorous popular
resistance) to impose his personal philosophy on
the nation as a whole.

Kennedy explicitly repudiated
the received doctrine of the
Establishment Clause—the so-called
Lemon test— but only time will tell
where the Court’s new history and
tradition test will take us.

itself would not necessarily have any particular
or significant implications.
Nonetheless, Kennedy is a sort of at least
symbolic watershed because it makes explicit a
change in constitutional direction that has been
observable for a decade or more in the Court’s
decisions. In the American constitutional order,
how are religion and government supposed to
relate to each other? The question has been
with us from the beginning. Over the latter
half of the twentieth century, the answer that
developed construed Jefferson’s legendary
“wall of separation between church and state”
to require a separation of religion from the
public sphere. Religion is a private matter that
should be protected in the private domain, but
governmental and public functions (including
public schools) should be secular—meaning not
religious. This “private religion/ secular public
sphere” paradigm was (unevenly) implemented
in a variety of areas—including public religious
expressions and funding of parochial schools—
but the school prayer cases were probably the
leading instance.

Over time the paradigm’s vulnerabilities
have become ever more conspicuous, leading
to frequent criticism of religion clause
jurisprudence as illogical and incoherent.
Recent decisions have accordingly moved
away from the private religion paradigm. The
Kennedy decision, with its explicit repudiation
of the Lemon test, solidifies and confirms
this movement.

Although the private religion paradigm has
its attractions, however, as well as its ardent
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But what if anything will emerge to replace the
Lemon test and the private religion paradigm?
The Kennedy majority indicated that it
would henceforth be guided by tradition and
history—a course that some justices especially
including Justice Stephen Breyer had already
been following for some time. But, as Justice
Sotomayor objected, tradition and history
hardly amount to a legal rule or doctrine.

Especially in an old and vast and exquisitely
pluralistic nation, tradition and history are
complex, and conflicting, and hence malleable
sources. However wise or misguided it may
have been, moreover, the private religion
paradigm itself is by now an important part of
American tradition and history. So then, where
will tradition and history take us? As always,
time will tell.

Steven Smith

The Law School is grateful to the law librarians at USD’s Pardee Legal Research Center,
and in particular to Elizabeth Parker and Sasha Nuñez, for their hard work on these essays.
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